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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Kremlin under fire 
President Yel'tsin can be forgiven for seeming confused by the current assault 
upon his leadership: of all places for this attack to originate, who would have 
expected his formerly docile procurator general and the generally supportive 
Federation Council to challenge his authority so dramatically? Nonetheless, the 
Federation Council's refusal to accept Yuri Skuratov's resignation, along with 
Skuratov's charges of coercion and blackmail forcing his resignation, represent 
one of the most serious threats to the Yel'tsin presidency. 
 
The Kremlin's response to the challenge, if speculation is to be believed (and 
speculation is unusually rampant, even for Russia, right now), was to sanction 
the broadcast of a video purporting to be the procurator in bed with prostitutes. 
The tape was apparently the instrument used last month to force Skuratov's 
resignation. If the Kremlin anticipated a reaction of the sort that last forced 
Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev out of office, it underestimated the newfound 
strength of Skuratov's backbone. Skuratov responded by labeling the tape, "the 
direct result of a carefully planned provocation...linked to one of my criminal 
investigations.'' (United Press International, 1242 PST, 19 Mar 99; clari.net) 
 
On 18 March, following the broadcast, both Yel'tsin and his chief of staff, General 
Bordyuzha, checked themselves out of the hospital and returned to the Kremlin, 
where Yel'tsin had a brief meeting with Skuratov. While Yel'tsin noted his 
reservations about Skuratov's "moral character," he also charged Bordyuzha with 
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launching a Security Council-based investigation of the video tape. (Agence 
France-Presse, 1034 PST, 18 Mar 99; clari.net) 
 
In a surprising move over the weekend, Yel'tsin then fired General Bordyuzha, 
removing him from both his positions as chief of staff and secretary of the 
Security Council. The Kremlin hinted that the heart trouble which put Bordyuzha 
in the hospital last week was the cause of his dismissal, but alternate 
interpretations suggest Bordyuzha either fell victim to Yel'tsin's knee-jerk 
response to his perceived need to reassert himself or that it was Bordyuzha 
himself who "bungled" the forced resignation of Skuratov last month. (Would 
Yel'tsin have put the blackmailer in charge of investigating the blackmail?) 
 
All sides in this conflict agree: There's more to come. 
 
APPARAT 
Borodin takes preemptive hospital vacation? 
Joining the burgeoning ranks of the Kremlin ill, Pavel Borodin checked himself 
into the hospital last week, just as the procurator's return to work sparked 
speculation of a criminal investigation that reached deep within the Kremlin. (The 
Moscow Times, 17 Mar 99; nexis) 
 
Before resigning in February, Skuratov launched a series of highly controversial 
investigations and raids on Russian companies, but it now seems that the most 
devastating allegations may come from information provided by Swiss authorities 
on the Swiss construction company, Mabetex. Mabetex was allegedly involved in 
renovations to the Kremlin, the former Gosplan offices and, other projects 
overseen by Borodin's Economic Management office and, according to reports, a 
Swiss official, Carla de Ponte, is due in Moscow this week to provide Skuratov 
with evidence of kickbacks to the Kremlin. (The Moscow Times, 16 Mar 99; 
nexis) 
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New chief of staff has ties to Berezovsky 
Aleksandr Voloshin, who was tapped by Yel'tsin to replace Nikolai Bordyuzha as 
chief of staff this weekend, is a former business associate of the ubiquitous Boris 
Berezovsky from the Russian Car Alliance Joint Stock Society. (ITAR-TASS, 14 
Dec 93; nexis) Whether or not this previous association suggests a current 
relationship, the appointment does reflect an attempt by the president to weaken 
the influence of the prime minister in the Kremlin. In the last round of apparat 
shuffle, Yevgeni Primakov had a notable voice in the selection of cadres, 
including the ousted General Bordyuzha. 
 
At this point, no successor has been named to Bordyuzha's Security Council 
seat. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
How much longer can Moscow beat that horse? 
During Duma hearings on NATO expansion, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev 
stated that he will take adequate measures in response to NATO's eastward 
advance (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 1600 GMT, 12 March 99; FBIS-EEU-
1999-0312), all in preparation for NATO's expansion which was formalized on 12 
March. These messages out of Moscow, a week prior to the formal induction of 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the alliance, were only a few of the 
signals that Moscow was sending NATO and any likely future NATO members. 
 
The recurring theme, in almost all of the public statements and debates was that 
NATO expansion would not bring security to Europe, only tension. A Russian 
foreign ministry statement spelled this out clearly, explaining that the expansion 
of the North Atlantic alliance "will not build trust and stability in international 
relations but on the contrary could lead to the emergence of new dividing lines." 
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(ITAR-TASS, 0911 GMT, 12 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/lexis-
nexis) 
 
Though obviously not a new theme, this was clearly a signal that Russia will fight 
hard to prevent any further expansion of NATO bringing the alliance even closer 
to the borders of the Russian Federation. This point was specifically addressed 
during discussions in the Duma that the anti-NATO interfactional group initiated a 
week prior to the formal expansion of NATO. Gennadi Zyuganov, leader of the 
Communist faction, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, chairman of the Liberal Democratic 
Party, apparently led the debate which centered on the possibility of further 
expansion beyond NATO's now enlarged forum. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
1135 GMT, 4 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0304) 
 
In the face of NATO expansion Moscow has also stepped up its attempts to 
make the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the lead 
security structure in Europe, thereby eclipsing NATO's role on the continent. The 
Russian foreign ministry highlighted this point by stating that "a dependable 
system for security and stability in Europe can only be created (...) by using the 
OSCE as the most representative and universal pan-European organization (...)." 
(ITAR-TASS, 0911 GMT, 12 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/lexis-
nexis) 
 
While Moscow has repeatedly stressed this point, particularly since the first 
round of NATO expansion became a fait accompli, it has not prevented other 
former Warsaw Pact nations and former Soviet republics from actively pursuing 
NATO membership in what will become a much-anticipated "second round." 
Russia will clearly score a major victory in Europe if it is able to delay indefinitely 
a second round or completely sabotage any further NATO expansion -- a goal on 
which Moscow has clearly set its sights. 
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The Russians could add such a victory to what may become at least a minor 
coup if they can in fact persuade NATO to adjust the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) treaty. The treaty, which has been in effect since 1990, has 
become outdated with NATO expansion, so the Russians claim. This treaty has 
become Moscow's latest target with an eye to limiting NATO weapons located in 
the new member states. 
 
In a series of talks conducted in Vienna early in March, representatives from 30 
countries worked on changes to the 1990 (CFE) treaty. (Agence France-Presse, 
1946 GMT, 10 Mar 99; lexis-nexis) What the end result of the negotiations will be 
remains to be seen, but apparently there was progress as far as the Russians 
were concerned. According to statements issued on 9 March, Moscow was 
pleased with the direction in which the talks were moving. (Interfax Russian 
News, 10 Mar 99; lexis-nexis) 
 
This probably translates to the Russians at least being allowed to keep extra 
forces in the treaty area under the rubric of "flank" and "peace-keeping" forces. 
Plans are to have a final agreement before the NATO conference scheduled to 
be held in the US in April. 
 
Moscow working on UNSCOM replacement 
As the world's attention was focused on NATO expansion and the alliance's 
ongoing negotiations avert a clash between Yugoslavia and NATO, Moscow 
continued to pursue the dissolution of the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) in Iraq. UNSCOM (and its chairman, Richard Butler), which has not 
conducted inspections in Iraq since late last year before US and UK strikes were 
initiated, has suffered from repeated attacks from Moscow. The latest assault, 
which has been mild compared to the attack mounted by Russia's ambassador to 
the UN in January, appears to be designed simply to keep up the pressure to 
dismantle UNSCOM. 
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Russian foreign ministry officials on 5 March reiterated accusations that 
UNSCOM was involved in "spying" operations with Butler's full knowledge. The 
ministry statement said that "Moscow, like many other capitals, finds it necessary 
to step up efforts to develop a new monitoring mechanism to guarantee reliable 
and impartial control over Iraqi military programs." Apparently Moscow is playing 
a lead role in developing a new mechanism for inspections in Iraq which have 
been initiated in the UN Security Council disarmament evaluation group for Iraq. 
(Interfax, 1536 GMT, 5 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0305) 
 
Jubilee! 
As the celebration of the "50th Jubilee of Russian Chinese Diplomatic Relations" 
approaches, it seems that there may actually be something to celebrate. (ITAR-
TASS, 0946 GMT, 16 Mar 99; FBIS-CHI-99-0316) Indeed, diplomatic relations 
have been flourishing for many months. The two countries have stood together 
on several key international affairs issues, including Iraq, Kosovo, the US-
Japanese Defense Pact, and now, the wider US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
issue. Together, they represent what has been described as the "Non-West 
Bloc." This sterile verbiage is much less offensive to the ear in which Cold War 
blocs still resonate, but the message is clear: Russia and China will continue to 
stand together against the West on issues that threaten regional security. Russia, 
for one, is not shy about involving other states in this bloc, specifically India and 
North Korea. Although the "Strategic Triangle" suggestion elicited no response 
from Delhi when it was proposed a few months ago, relations with China and 
North Korea improve daily. At recent high-level talks in Pyongyang, discussion 
was topped by collective security and TMD concerns. (CNN On-line ITAR-TASS, 
17 Mar 99) 
 
With the success of the summit still sweet, Russia and China have coordinated 
their reaction to the proposed US TMD system. Their "unanimous" concurrence 
on this issue is fed by fears of a new arms race and the inevitable strain that it 
would place on East-West relations. (CNN On-line AP, 11 Mar 99) The 
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strengthening of Sino-Russian diplomacy is certainly accelerating, and the 
opportunity to coordinate policies against the West is proving to be the best fuel. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Legislation coordination board established in the justice ministry 
Responding to the need to bring regional legislation into line with federal law, the 
justice ministry has established a Federation Component Acts of Legislation 
Administration whose purpose is to review the legislation of individual regions. 
 
Justice Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov announced that around one-third of all 
legislation in the regions "is not in line with the Russian Federation Constitution 
and legislation." Evidence of discrepancies between federal and regional 
legislation will now allow the justice ministry to order a miscreant region to rectify 
the mistake. If the region should refuse to comply, the justice ministry could 
appeal to the General Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Antimonopoly Policy 
and Support for Entrepreneurial Activity [sic]. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 25 Feb 99, p. 
1; FBIS-SOV-1999-0225) 
 
As helpful as creating yet another bureaucracy agency might seem, the problem 
with regional legislative compliance has less to do with monitoring than it does 
with a lack of respect the regions have come to have for federal authorities. After 
the regions were effectively cut loose from federal support in the wake of the 
currency crisis of last year, they have been more occupied with keeping their own 
leaky boats afloat than they have with constitutional reforms. If the Russian 
Federation wishes to remain a single state de facto as well as de jure, it will have 
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to bring the regions to heel. Right now, trust on all sides is lacking and that is, 
after all, the glue that holds societies together. All the federal government can do 
is make and remake its bureaucracy to show the regions, the world, and perhaps 
even itself, that it is doing something. 
 
Yel'tsin makes changes in presidential appointments 
President Boris Yel'tsin has appointed Vladimir Chistyakov as presidential 
representative to the Novgorod Region and Leonid Semergey to the Volgograd 
Region. He also removed Vyacheslav Bembetov from the Republic of Kalmykia, 
as well as Vitali Spiridonov from the Krasnodar Territory. (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1630 GMT, 2 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0302) 
 
The system of presidential representatives is an interesting one. Intended to 
serve as the president's five senses in each of the federation's 89 regions, the 
representatives increasingly find themselves subject to the mercy of their 
appointed region. On one hand, the representatives are meant to coordinate the 
administration of federal policy locally by interacting with the field officers of the 
numerous members of the federal bureaucracy, while on another level the 
presidential representative is to liaise between regional officials and the federal 
center. At times these roles work at cross-purposes. Often the presidential 
representative is cut off from information from within the regions, as he is 
(rightfully) viewed as being a spy from the center with a briefcase full of worthless 
federal legislation which made little sense in Moscow and is completely ludicrous 
in the provinces where it was supposed to be applied. The representative is 
similarly put under pressure by the president to fix problems which are simply 
beyond his capacity. It is not a job anyone should envy. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Yabloko steadies itself for elections and becomes a party  
For the first time since its inception, Grigori Yavlinsky has decided to move his 
organization from the status of "movement," which allows participants to remain 
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members of other parties, to a "party," which allows membership in Yabloko only. 
Perhaps smelling blood in the water, public opinion polls show that Yavlinsky's 
years-long strategy of opposition to almost everything is about to pay off, and 
Yavlinsky is readying his troops for action. He, and perhaps Yuri Luzhkov, the 
popular mayor of Moscow and the head of the exciting new party, Fatherland, are 
poised to make a good showing in the next Duma, and perhaps presidential, 
elections. This new party is for those who "can no longer vote for Yel'tsin but still 
do not want to vote for [Communist Party leader Gennadi] Zyuganov," said 
Yavlinsky. ("Kommersant," 3 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) 
 
This transformation comes with risks. Three of the five Social Democratic Party 
members belonging to Yabloko have already left the party, and it is possible that 
others will find association with Yavlinsky untenable in their home districts. But 
on the other hand, a more hierarchical structure might make for tighter party 
discipline, a necessary condition for a successful run for office. 
 
MEDIA 
Duma adopts law on mass media moral standards 
Without the blessings bestowed on the modern Russian family by the television 
"V" chip available elsewhere, the Duma has proposed an old-fashioned remedy 
for uncomfortable or inconvenient information -- censorship. Of course it travels 
under the name of morality, much as it does in many parts of the world, but 
without a strong history of media independence, this law may have an especially 
chilling effect in Russia. 
 
The bill also envisions an ominously titled Supreme Council empowered to define 
morality, identify violations, and punish with a series of fines. Especially 
worrisome is that the council, far from being independent from political pressure, 
is constituted from it. The president, the justice ministry or either house of the 
Federal Assembly may request the council to provide analysis of the moral 
content of the federation's media. This last task implies a potentially intrusive 
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monitoring power which could easily be used to control who says what on the air 
or in print. 
 
The Supreme Council will be a permanent state body, made up of 12 members: 
three each appointed by the president, the Duma, the Federation Council, and by 
the government. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1219 GMT, 10 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0310) 
 
Citizens organize to oppose new media law 
Even as the Duma attempted to return the free press to the control of the political 
ideologues, glimpses of a civil society could be seen with the Russian Pen Club's 
voiced opposition to the law. 
 
Communist-allied actor and filmmaker Nikolai Gubenko said "morality is the truth" 
and the media warping of the "truth" endangers the very "braces" holding society 
together. "To narrow this process, put it into some bureaucratic frames, means 
trying to establish control, in fact censorship, of the live process of the 
development of society."  
 
The Pen Club is headed by writer Andrei Bitov and includes writers and poets 
Andrei Voznesensky, Fazil Iskander, Viktor Astafev, Bella Akhmadullina, Zoya 
Boguslavskaya, Viktor Yerofeev, Vladimir Makanin, and Anatoli Pristavkin. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 1227 GMT, 13 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999- 0313) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR Fred Drummond 
 
Will the real Russian stealth fighter please stand up? 
In an earlier issue of Editorial Digest (1 February 99) we wrote about the public 
debut of MiG's Project 1.42, the so-called MFI (from the Russian initials for 
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multipurpose combat fighter). Notable in the flurry of Russian press releases on 
the plane was a charge by Moskovskie novosti that the aircraft shown was not 
the actual stealth MFI but instead an earlier design used as an engine testbed. 
Since that time, more pictures of the aircraft have appeared along with a host of 
western press reports. It seems that the doubters may be on to something. 
 
Western media reports ranged from reprints of Russian press releases to outright 
skepticism of the aircraft along the lines of Moskovskie novosti. The US 
publication Air Force Magazine, published by the Air Force Association (an often-
times unofficial outlet for US Air Force policies and statements), stated flatly that 
the Russian aircraft which has been touted as the "equivalent to the stealthy 
USAF F-22... does not exist." (Air Force Magazine, March 1999) It called the 
aircraft that was shown a testbed for new engines. 
 
Noted aviation writer Bill Sweetman, in a short article in Popular Science 
magazine, doubted Russian officials' claims that the aircraft was as stealthy as 
the US F-22, barring some unlikely Russian breakthrough in stealth technology. 
(Popular Science, April 1999) Sweetman also mentioned that the "new" aircraft 
wasn't very new. As we pointed out in our article, even the Russians admitted the 
aircraft shown was designed "15 years ago," an eternity in aircraft design and 
development, as a comparison with US stealthy fighter designs of the YF/F-22, 
YF-23, and the various Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) designs shows. 
 
In looking at the pictures of MFI, it is highly unlikely that the MFI is what the 
Russians claim. It most probably is a one-off testbed aircraft. The MiG design 
bureau has a history of developing singular- or limited-run designs to test new 
ideas and systems. These experimental aircraft often incorporated many features 
or components of regular production aircraft, one reason being that it is cheaper 
and quicker to use as much "off-the-shelf" product as possible rather than to start 
off with a clean sheet of paper. (For further information on MiG designs, see MiG: 
Fifty Years of Secret Aircraft Design, by R.A. Belakov and J. Marmain; English-
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language edition published by the US Naval Institute Press.) The MFI shown 
smacks of this origin. The nose in sideview is essentially a MiG-29 cockpit to 
which a flattened, somewhat ovigal nosecone is attached. (The nosecone in fact 
resembles that of the US F-16.) The twin vertical tails look remarkably like that of 
the Sukhoi Su-25. The US has also produced aircraft in this manner, culling 
components from the inventory of US aircraft. The experimental X-29 was based 
in part on the F-5, and the so-called Stealth fighter (actually an attack aircraft), 
the F-117, is a new shape encompassing tried-and-true components from a 
variety of other aircraft. 
 
What the photos of the MFI reveal is that the design is not stealthy: The shape is 
all wrong. Basic understanding of stealth technology and design philosophy, 
which really means a basic knowledge of physics, casts serious doubt on 
Russian assertions of the plane's reputed stealthiness. Just a few examples will 
suffice. It has a large air intake on the underside of the fuselage: Even if treated 
with radar absorbent material (RAM), it will produce a noticeable radar reflection. 
Likewise, the aircraft's wing leading and trailing edges are not aligned with each 
other. A successful stealth design aligns leading and trailing edges, in all 
aspects, with each other. This is because there will always be some order of 
magnitude of radar reflection from an aircraft, and radar energy is reflected or 
transmitted from trailing edges in addition to the primary returns from energy 
hitting the leading edges of an aircraft. Minimizing the number of directions that 
reflect radar energy will travel from the aircraft reduces its radar signature. The 
B-2 is a great example of this concept. It is essentially a flying diamond that 
directs any reflected radar energy away from the aircraft's flight path. The MFI 
does not follow this design practice. Superficially the MFI resembles the 
Eurofighter, a stealthy design, but closer comparison shows how "unstealthy" the 
MFI must be. There are too many angles, too many inherent radar reflectors. 
 
So what is the aircraft shown? Most likely it indeed a flying testbed, used in the 
development of new engines, radar and weapons systems, and the like. The 
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question remains, where is the "real" Project 1.42? Have the Russians actually 
built the stealthy MFI? Is it just a paper airplane? Moskovskie novosti's charges 
that the aircraft shown was part of a ploy to get increased funding for further 
development of an F-22 challenger is much more believable than statements 
coming from the MiG bureau or the Russian government. 
 
For the West, the significance of all this is that the Russians are far from 
developing, much less producing, an effective challenger to the F-22. Where the 
Russians may be on to something is in the continued development of systems 
that may pose threats to western aircraft, stealthy and otherwise. Their rubles (or 
should we make that dollars) would be better invested in upgrading their S-300 
surface-to-air missile family and the S-400 follow-on.  
 
More on S-400 
In a very informative article by Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, more details on 
the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system were revealed. (Nezavisimoe 
voyennoe obozrenie, No. 6, 19-25 Feb 99) Apart from discussing some more 
technical details on the system, the article was noteworthy in discussing broader-
range issues such as employment philosophy and the intended targets of the 
system. The author is obviously well-versed in the topic of air defense, noting 
that the S-400 system's exceptionally long-range intercept capability is necessary 
to counter the long-range stand-off weapons the West has deployed over the 
years. Mentioned specifically were the US AGM-84 SLAM (an air-launched, long-
range attack missile), the French ASMP nuclear armed missile and the 
conventional warhead Apache missile. 
 
With the current S-300 system, the launch platforms of these weapons were at 
risk of being shot down. This isn't the case with follow-on Western missiles such 
as the US JASSM (Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile), which the article also 
mentions; the greater range of the S-400 is needed to defend against the 
launching aircraft, as well as to shoot down support aircraft such as jammers and 
 14 
command and control platforms. Generally, these large support aircraft orbit at 
distances outside the maximum SAM engagement envelopes. Development and 
deployment of the S-400 may put those aircraft at higher risk than they are today. 
The author is also following the US press (Aviation Week, Popular Science, and 
others), as he discusses the possibility of seeing high-altitude, hypersonic aircraft 
within two or three decades; the S-400 would theoretically be able to target them. 
More immediate-term threats, though, include stealthy cruise missiles and 
ballistic missiles. 
 
In our article from last issue (Editorial Digest, 16 February 99) we mentioned that 
the long range of the S-400 would make it in effect an antiballistic missile system. 
The Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie article spoke to that point, with the 
reporter noting that the S-400's "anti-missile potential... has been increased to 
within limits established by the ABM treaty." Another interesting fact revealed is 
that one of the S-400 missile variants may become the "standard long-range 
weapon of [Russian] Air Force fighter aircraft." 
 
Bottom line: the S-400 system is a well-thought out replacement or upgrade for 
the S-300 family and indeed most, if not all, of the earlier Russian SAM systems. 
Some radar components have just started testing, and the missiles have yet to 
be produced. The article did include a picture of what the paper captioned as the 
Triumf TEL (transporter-erector-launcher) -- it appears to be an S-300PMU (SA-
10) TEL. This makes sense, as the S-400 would logically incorporate as many 
components as possible from the S-300 family. Such an approach would enable 
the Russians not only to integrate easily the S-400 into the inventory, but also 
would help to facilitate upgrading export S-300 systems. As always, money is the 
biggest challenge with which the S-400 designers must cope. The system is 
being pursued, and bears watching. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
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By Sarah Miller 
 
Bye, bye Boris, redux 
March madness, Russian style: With Primakov on vacation and Berezovsky in 
Azerbaijan, President Yel'tsin caught up on some lingering business. Yel'tsin's 
unilateral decision to remove Boris Berezovsky from his position as CIS 
executive secretary followed weeks of interpersonal discord between Berezovsky 
and the prime minister. (See Editorial Digest, 15 February 1999) Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze and Uzbek President Islam Karimov lodged the 
most outspoken disapproval of Yel'tsin's decision, saying that personal 
differences and an inappropriate Duma resolution prompted it. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 10 Mar 99) 
 
Regardless of who prompted the ouster and for which reasons, Yel'tsin's action 
further confirms Russia's chokehold on all CIS decision-making. Ivan Rybkin, 
who is charged with CIS responsibilities, outlined his understanding of the 
dismissal procedure early in February: "The purely formal aspect of the question 
is that the Executive Secretary is appointed by a consensus vote, or by 
agreement -- they usually meet behind closed doors -- by the presidents of the 
CIS countries. How it will be this time...I don't know." (Ekho Moskvy, 1236 GMT, 
10 Feb 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0210) 
 
Berezovsky's ouster is not surprising, but the timing certainly could be better. 
Only last week, Yel'tsin accepted Primakov's suggestion to hold the CIS Heads 
of State summit -- postponed since October -- on 2 April. (Russia Today, ITAR-
TASS, 17 Mar 99) This much-anticipated summit is an important one since 
several key issues will be discussed, including the Collective Security Treaty and 
CIS reform efforts. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are slated to withdraw formally 
from the Collective Security Treaty at that time and, unless amendments are 
made to the provisions on border security among others, Georgia may withdraw 
as well. The treaty does little to boost CIS collective security, but it has 
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preoccupied member states and prevented discussion of the larger issues: CIS 
reform and economic integration. The summit is the perfect opportunity to 
advance the discussion of reform plans, but collective security and the election of 
a new executive secretary may steal the show instead. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Welcome back to the Money Store 
It now appears almost certain that the IMF soon will resume lending to Ukraine. 
The organization granted a $2.2 billion Extended Fund Facility loan last 
September, but only delivered two tranches totaling $336 million before funding 
was halted. At the time, IMF representatives criticized the country for failing to 
fulfill a long list of agreed-upon structural reforms. Now, however, many of those 
reforms have been completed. 
 
In a statement released on 16 March, the IMF praised Ukraine for its recent fiscal 
and structural reform, and announced that its representatives would recommend 
that the organization's executive board release the third tranche of the EFF loan. 
That tranche is reported to be around $150 million. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
2106 CET, 16 Mar 99; nexis, and Xinhua General News Service, 1731 EST, 16 
Mar 99; nexis) 
 
The last two hurdles to a resumption of lending were apparently overcome when 
the Kuchma administration lowered the trading corridor for the hryvnya from 2.5-
3.5 to the dollar to 3.4-4.6 to the dollar (for background, see ISCIP Digest, 15 
February 99) and then reorganized the structure of the government's executive 
ministries. The lowering of the trading corridor allowed the government to stop 
using its cash reserves to "prop up" the currency, while the ministry 
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reorganization, announced just this week, will lower the number of ministries from 
21 to 18. According to ITAR-TASS, the ministries for information, science and 
technology, and family and youth affairs will all be eliminated. (ITAR-TASS, 15 
Mar 99; nexis) It is not clear from the government's announcement, however, 
what new bodies may be created to fulfill the current functions of these ministries. 
 
Meanwhile, since its de facto devaluation on 9 February, the currency has 
performed significantly better than some western financial pundits had predicted. 
When the trading corridor was lowered, some observers suggested that the 
currency's value could quickly drop as much as 35 percent. By the end of 
February, however, it had lost just under 5 percent of its value, trading at 3.6 to 
the dollar. (Agence France-Presse, 26 Feb 99; nexis) 
 
Love makes the world go 'round 
Apparently, the Kuchma administration has been perfecting its tightrope-walking 
skills. During the month of March, the government has managed to integrate 
itself deeper into the CIS, while maintaining strong support for -- and ties to -- 
NATO. 
 
First, on 3 March, the parliament voted to join the CIS Interparliamentary 
Assembly, something that it had refused to do repeatedly in the past. The 
measure needed 226 votes to pass, and garnered 230. It provoked rancorous 
debate, which culminated with members of the nationalist Rukh party rushing 
forward in an attempt to steal the microphone, thus preventing Speaker 
Oleksandr Tkachenko from announcing the vote. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
1237 CET, 3 Mar 99; nexis) The measure was supported by both President 
Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko, perhaps in an 
election year bow to the power held by Speaker Tkachenko. Around the time of 
the vote, there was also a marked increase in Kuchma administration rhetoric on 
the importance of ties between Russians and Ukrainians. 
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Just ten days later, however, the administration jumped back on its tightrope and 
released several statements in support of NATO. A statement issued by the 
foreign ministry on 13 March said, "We hope that the open accession of new 
countries to NATO will contribute to security and stability in Europe ... and to the 
further promotion of the ideals of democracy and liberty on our continent." (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 2234 GMT, 12 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts/nexis) Later, Vladimir Gorbulin, secretary of the security and defense 
parliamentary committee and a supporter of President Kuchma, said it was "too 
early" for Ukraine to join NATO, but that the country had every right to do so. 
(Xinhua General News Service, 1231 EST, 18 Mar 99; nexis) The administration 
also praised the success of the NATO-Ukraine Special Partnership Charter, 
which was signed in November of 1998. (For further background, see ISCIP 
Digest, 16 November 98.) 
 
One step closer to Nairobi 
Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko could soon be looking for a 
new country, now that the United States has officially refused his request for 
political asylum. As reported in the 1 March ISCIP digest, Lazarenko was 
arrested in New York City when he tried to enter the country using an invalid 
visa. He is currently wanted in both Ukraine and Switzerland for a number of 
charges, including embezzlement. 
 
Lazarenko claimed that he suffered "persecution" in Ukraine, and asked for 
political asylum. Curiously, the request came shortly after Ukraine formally 
requested his extradition. 
 
The INS has not yet ruled on Lazarenko's contention that his life would be in peril 
if he were extradited, so no decision has been made on Ukraine's extradition 
request. Because of this "fear" for his life, Lazarenko has asked that he be 
allowed to remain indefinitely in the United States. Thankfully, Lazarenko's 
campaign for president of Ukraine seems not to have been affected. "I am still 
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the official candidate from the Hromada Party to the presidential elections," he 
wrote from the detention center where he is being held. (ITAR-TASS, 5 Mar 99; 
nexis) He has so far not explained how he would run Ukraine from San 
Francisco, the city where his family is now living. 
 
BELARUS 
Police reprisals escalate 
The outlawed election preparations of the disbanded parliament have apparently 
begun to concern President Lukashenka. The Belarusian KGB has markedly 
increased its "pressure" on opposition figures, and some of those opposition 
figures have begun talking publicly about possible mass arrests. Not only have a 
number of newspapers recently been "searched" by the KGB, but six members of 
the opposition Central Commission for Presidential Elections have been visited 
and "warned" by KGB representatives against participating in the outlawed 
election. (Belapan, 1605 GMT, 13 Mar 99; nexis) In addition, over a dozen 
opposition members have been arrested, questioned and released. 
 
On 17 March, the home of one of the heads of the Helsinki Human Rights 
Committee was ransacked, and police confiscated a number of documents 
relating to the upcoming election. (Belapan, 17 Mar 99; nexis) Just days earlier, 
on 11 March, Victor Honchar, chairman of the Election Commission, was 
released from "detention" after 10 days in captivity. Honchar claimed that he was 
repeatedly beaten in prison, but confirmed that his commission will press on with 
its plan to hold the presidential election on 16 May. (For further background on 
Honchar's arrest, see the 1 March ISCIP Digest.) 
 
While the opposition members continue to move forward, they do so with very 
little attention from the West. With the exception of an OSCE offer to mediate 
between President Lukashenka and the disbanded parliament, there have been 
few statements from world leaders about the situation. This apparently concerns 
Honchar, who has begun asking publicly for Western support. 
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Yes to nukes! 
President Aleksandr Lukashenka said recently that, because of the expansion of 
NATO, "the security of Russia's borders is in question," and he is willing to do his 
part to deal with the situation. In the interest of "our common fatherland," he said, 
"nuclear weapons could be returned" to Belarus. (Interfax, 25 and 26 Feb 99; 
nexis) 
 
Lukashenka's statements are actually not new. He has repeatedly complained 
about the previous administration's decision to "bow to Western pressure" and 
become a nuclear-free state. Because of that nuclear-free status, 80 nuclear 
missiles were returned to Russia, and all strategic missile launch sites were 
scheduled to be destroyed by 2001. (Interfax, 26 Feb 99; nexis) In 1997, 
however, Lukashenka announced that the missile launch sites would not be 
destroyed. 
 
Russia, for its part, is downplaying Lukashenka's focus on military responses to 
NATO. Several Russian sources have denied any plan to re-deploy strategic 
missiles on Belarus' territory. The country has in the past, however, supported 
Lukashenka's decision not to destroy its strategic missile launch sites.  
 
MOLDOVA 
Who says prisoners can't vote? 
Moldova finally has a new government, and all the country needed to get it was a 
little help from an imprisoned deputy. 
 
On 4 March, 51 members of the Moldovan parliament voted to confirm the new 
cabinet put together by Prime Minister-designate Ion Sturza, and Sturza began 
work. Unfortunately, the parliament has 101 members, so the constitutional court 
ruled the vote invalid. (ITAR-TASS, 6 Mar 99; nexis) At that point, because of 
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large divisions in the ruling coalition, it seemed that the government might fail to 
receive approval. 
 
However, on 12 March, the parliament voted again, and this time approved 
Sturza's cabinet with 52 votes in favor. The difference was the vote of deputy Illie 
Ilasku, who is currently serving time in a Tiraspol prison for various Transdniestr-
related charges. Ilasku requested in writing that his vote in favor be counted, and 
provided the one-vote margin of victory for the administration. (Interfax, 12 Mar 
99; nexis) Sturza's opponents have vowed to protest the vote once again at the 
constitutional court, but their challenge will most likely fail. 
 
The approval of Sturza and his cabinet clears the way for a resumption of lending 
from both the IMF and the World Bank. The cabinet represents both change and 
stability, as only four of 17 cabinet ministers were replaced; the ministers of state, 
economics and reform, transport and communication, and trade and industry. 
(Interfax, 0930 GMT, 4 Mar 99; nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Looking for friends in NATO 
In response to the mounting military aid from Russia to Armenia, Azerbaijan has 
sought to strengthen its ties to NATO, in particular to the US and Turkey. Over 
recent months the Azeris have publicly invited the US and Turkey to establish 
military bases on their territory. In connection with the present crisis in Kosovo, 
the Azeris demonstrated their goodwill and their utility as allies by detaining a 
Russian cargo plane carrying six MiG-21 jet fighters which the Azeris presumed 
were en route to Yugoslavia. (The Washington Times, 23 Mar 99) Russian 
authorities responded that the aircraft belonged to Kazakhstan and were bound 
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for Slovakia. On 29 March Azerbaijani President Heider Aliev announced that the 
cargo plane would be returned to its Russian owners, but avoided commenting 
on the fighter planes. (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 Mar 99) On an earlier occasion, the 
Azeris volunteered to send soldiers to Kosovo as part of a peacekeeping 
mission. 
 
CHECHNYA 
Who's trying to aggravate matters? 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov ordered his military to shoot down any 
aircraft that violates the republic's borders. The Chechen security minister, Ali 
Atgeriev, explained the presidential decision by saying that Russian planes have 
overflown parts of Chechnya on several occasions over the last few days. 
(Agence France-Presse, 1208 GMT, 29 Mar 99; nexis) Russia has resorted to 
displaying its superior air power to indicate its displeasure with Chechnya on 
several occasions since the end of hostilities in 1996, yet this instance is more 
troubling as it comes on the heels of three particularly disruptive and violent 
incidents. 
 
Russian officials issued stern threats after the federal interior ministry 
representative in Chechnya, Gen. Gennadi Shpigun, was abducted on 5 March. 
In language reminiscent of the pre-invasion days, Interior Minister Sergei 
Stepashin told journalists that the "most rigorous measures" could be applied 
against the kidnappers and that law enforcement officials could act within the 
boundaries of the Russian Federation. Russia certainly retains the force 
capability in the North Caucasus to realize these threats. When the Russian 
military withdrew from Chechnya, the units relocated to other bases in the North 
Caucasus. Thus, tens of thousands of men and hundreds of vehicles are now 
stationed in nearby cities like Vladikavkaz and Mozdok. In the ensuing weeks, 
however, Kremlin officials softened their rhetoric and seemed to back away from 
a military solution. On 24 March the Chechen authorities announced that six 
persons had been arrested in connection with the kidnapping; still, the general 
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remained in captivity. (Interfax, 1045 GMT, 23 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
The bombing of an outdoor market in the North Ossetian capital Vladikavkaz on 
19 March claimed 51 fatalities and over 100 casualties. No group took 
responsibility for the blast and possible scenarios proliferated quickly. Such 
explanations include: an Ingush reprisal against the bombing of an Ingush village 
a week earlier, and certain Russian factions trying to forestall a planned meeting 
between Maskhadov and Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov. Usually the 
latter explanation is offered by Chechen authorities, but in this case it came from 
none other than Stepashin, who said that the bombing in Vladikavkaz and, the 
third violent act, the attempted assassination of Maskhadov are "links in the 
same chain" and "the aim of these acts of terrorism is to snap the delicate thread 
of cooperation that exits between Moscow and Grozny." (ITAR-TASS, 1615 
GMT, 21 Mar 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Tashkent bombings produce wave of arrests and accusations 
The official interpretation of the series of bomb explosions (according to the 
reports, there were at least six and possibly as many as eight explosions) which 
occurred in Uzbekistan's capital city on 16 February is that they were intended to 
assassinate President Karimov and to destabilize the country politically. (Agence 
France-Presse, 1349 GMT, 16 Feb 99; nexis) The Uzbek government has 
identified a rather vague coalition of Islamic extremist groups and opposition 
activists from the outlawed Erk (Freedom) Party (an offshoot of Uzbekistan's first 
opposition party, Birlik or Unity, which appeared in 1989 and enjoyed legal status 
until 1992) as the main agents behind the bombings. President Karimov has 
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repeatedly stated that this unlikely alliance was provided with support from 
terrorist groups based in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan. (Agence France-Presse, 1217 GMT, 23 Feb 99; nexis, and Uzbek 
Television First Channel, 1630 GMT, 1 Mar 99; The British Broadcasting 
Corporation/nexis) 
 
All of the so-called Islamic extremists are said to have ties to either Wahhabi or 
Hezbollah groups, including groups such as the "Uzbekiston Islom Harakati" 
(Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, said to have Wahhabi ties) and the Hezb-e 
Tahrir-al-Islomii (Islamic Freedom Party), which Interior Minister Zakir Almatov 
accused of organizing a "Hezbollah militia." (Agence France-Presse, 1217 GMT, 
23 Feb 99; nexis, and TASS, 18 Mar 1999; nexis) 
 
By 23 February at least 35-40 people had already been arrested, all of whom 
were said to belong to radical religious groups. (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 Feb 99) 
Since then, dozens more have been detained, including not only local Muslim 
leaders, but also human rights activists and Erk Party sympathizers. On 26 
February Vitali Ponomarev, the acting director of the Society for Assistance of 
Human Rights in Central Asia, told journalists that he believed at least 500 
people had been arrested in connection with the 16 February bombings in 
Tashkent. (RFE/RL Newsline, 1 Mar 99) 
 
Many human rights officials believe that the Uzbek government is using the 
Tashkent bombings as an excuse to crush any remaining signs of opposition to 
President Karimov's policies. Using methods reminiscent of Soviet law 
enforcement practices, the Uzbek police have detained not only people who are 
thought to be directly involved with the opposition, but also their family members. 
President Karimov has appealed to a number of foreign governments to assist 
him in his search for the main organizers of the bombings, all of whom are 
thought to have fled the country. Thus far, Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkish 
law enforcement personnel have cooperated in arresting and extraditing a 
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number of suspects to Uzbekistan. However, up to now the only evidence that 
the Uzbek government has produced in order to verify its claim that the bombing 
was organized by Erk Party leaders and Muslim militants is an interview with 
three young men who claim to have been coerced into joining terrorist training 
camps in Turkey and Chechnya. These men also claim that the camps were run 
personally by Muhammad Solih (the Erk Party's founder). Given the fact that the 
men did not actually recognize Solih when he visited the camps, but were told by 
others who he was, this is hardly incontrovertible proof of Solih's involvement. 
(Uzbek Television First Channel, 1630 GMT, 1 Mar 99; The British Broadcasting 
Corporation/nexis) Furthermore, without material evidence of these alleged 
eyewitnesses' claims, or of the Uzbek government's charges against Erk and 
various unofficial Muslim groups, there is no reason to believe any of the 
allegations which President Karimov's administration has made as to the identity 
and motives of the bombers. 
 
Several other theories have been put forth to explain who might have organized 
the bombings. According to one of these rumors, it was the Russian government 
which carried out the bombings in order to pressure President Karimov to 
reconsider his recent decision to withdraw from the CIS Collective Security 
Treaty. Another theory is that the recently dismissed first deputy prime minister, 
Ismoil Djurabekov, who is also purported to have strong links to Tashkent's 
organized crime network, may have been behind the attacks. (The Moscow 
Times, 18 Feb 99; nexis) In an interview broadcast on Iranian radio, the chairman 
of the outlawed Birlik Party, Abdurahim Polat(ov), suggested yet another 
possibility: namely, that it was President Karimov's own administration which 
carried out the bombings. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1530 GMT, 17 
Feb 99; The British Broadcasting Corporation/nexis) As farfetched as this 
hypothesis might sound at first, it is not completely unreasonable. The bomb 
attacks have provided a legitimate excuse for government forces to crack down 
on all opposition sympathizers and for the imposition of stringent controls on the 
movements and activities of Uzbekistan's residents, especially within Tashkent. 
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(Agence France-Presse, 0918 GMT, 17 Feb 99; nexis) These types of actions 
might not have been so easily tolerated by the country's citizens and foreign 
residents, without the shock and panic produced by the bombings. With 
parliamentary and presidential elections approaching in late 1999 and early 
2000, respectively, President Karimov's administration may have been searching 
for a way to neutralize any group which could seriously challenge the current 
government's hold on power. 
 
Whether there is any truth to Mr. Polat's theory, it is quite plausible that those 
who organized the bombings received some degree of assistance from members 
of Uzbekistan's security and law enforcement services, considering the 
magnitude and complexity of the operation. Within a two-hour period, bombs 
were detonated at six separate sites throughout the city. These sites include the 
Cabinet of Ministers' building in Independence Square (Mustaqillik maidoni), the 
interior ministry headquarters, the new Uzbek National Bank building, a movie 
theater in Independence Square, the area near the airport, and the street on 
which the Turkmen, Tajik, Belarusian, and Georgian embassies are located. 
(TASS, 17 Feb 99; nexis) It is not yet clear precisely what type of explosive 
devices were used; some reports describe all of the explosives as car bombs, 
whereas other accounts state that at least two bombs had actually been placed 
inside one or two government buildings. (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 28 Feb 
99, p. 3; nexis, and The Associated Press, 17 Feb 99; nexis)  
 
Installing explosive devices inside either the Cabinet of Ministers or the interior 
ministry headquarters would have been an extremely difficult and risky venture, 
due to the tight security normally practiced at both places. The scope of the 
operation would have also required a substantial amount of careful planning and 
coordination well ahead of the date for which the actual attacks were scheduled 
and a fair number of people must have been involved. The more time and 
personnel are required to carry out terrorist activities, the greater the likelihood 
that their plans will be detected by the authorities. (See Coup d'Etat: A Practical 
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Handbook, by Edward Luttwak: Knopf, 1969) These facts alone suggest that the 
perpetrators of the attacks may have had a considerable amount of help from 
government officials close to the president, and/or from members of the security 
services. Without such assistance, it would have been very difficult to obtain 
access to detailed and up-to-the-minute information regarding President 
Karimov's plans and movements on 16 February. Judging by the fact that the 
explosion at the Cabinet of Ministers' building missed the president's car only by 
a matter of seconds, his attackers must have been able to follow his movements 
quite closely. 
 
Another significant piece of evidence was announced by President Karimov 
himself, a few days after the bombings. The president informed journalists that 
one of the suspects being sought in connection with the attacks, Ulughbek 
Bobojonov, had been seen inside the Cabinet of Ministers' building six times prior 
to 16 February, allegedly with the permission of an unnamed deputy prime 
minister. The president did not mention what Bobojonov's connections to the 
deputy prime minister might have been, and refrained from accusing the deputy 
prime minister of deliberately aiding those responsible for the bomb attacks. (AP 
Worldstream, 1245 Eastern Time, 23 Feb 99; nexis) Should irrepressible 
evidence emerge that members of the Uzbek government were indeed involved 
in the attacks, the deputy prime minister might make a useful scapegoat. 
 
Perhaps the most crucial question is how a car bearing armed men and 
explosives was able to breach the security cordon in front of the Cabinet of 
Ministers' building, just prior to the president's arrival in Independence Square. 
Normally, police officers prevent regular traffic (both vehicular and pedestrian) 
from using any of the roads along which the president is expected to travel and 
bar access to the entire area surrounding the main government offices well 
before the president's arrival. Therefore, it is quite surprising that the bomb-laden 
car was able to come anywhere near the Cabinet of Ministers' building, unless 
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the president's attackers were working in collusion with members of the security 
services, or were law enforcement officers themselves. 
 
In view of the above-mentioned facts, it is curious that President Karimov was so 
quick to accuse Erk Party members of planning and implementing the bomb 
attacks. Neither Erk nor Birlik has any history of using violence to achieve it aims; 
on the contrary, these two parties' representatives have consistently attempted to 
work with the Uzbek government to introduce a greater degree of democracy and 
respect for human rights in their country, even after both parties were banned. 
Furthermore, although various "radical" Muslim groups in Uzbekistan have been 
charged with committing a range of violent acts, from vandalism to murder, there 
is doubt as to the validity of many of these charges. Most of the "Wahhabis" who 
have been arrested and are currently serving prison sentences were convicted 
for possessing either narcotics or illegal weapons. This is a far cry from planning 
and carrying out six closely timed bomb attacks in heavily guarded areas of the 
capital. Finally, considering how closely many Muslim leaders and their 
communities are watched in Uzbekistan, it seems likely that the security services 
would have caught wind of their plans. 
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